

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

NETWORK ACQUISITION PARTNERSHIP
ALLIANCE, LLC, a Texas limited liability
company,

Plaintiff,

v.

CES PROPERTIES, INC., a Washington
corporation; and CHARLES EDWARD
SPRINGMAN and JANE HAGUE, and their
marital community,

Defendants.

No.

COMPLAINT

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff, Network Acquisition Partnership Alliance, LLC (“NAPA”), alleges as
follows:

I. PARTIES

1. NAPA is a Texas limited liability company all of whose members are citizens
of Texas.

2. CES Properties, Inc. (“CES”) is a Washington corporation with its principal
place of business in King County, Washington.

1 building and storage center) owned by entities that Springman represented he solely
2 controlled. These entities and Property Management Agreements are further described below.

3 8. On July 1, 2000, Sherron entered a property management agreement with
4 NAP/Springman Fund XI (Fairwood) LLC to manage the Fairwood apartment complex. The
5 agreement was signed for by NAP/Springman Fund (Fairwood) XI by Springman as president
6 of CES, the managing member of the LLC, and by Springman as president of Sherron.

7 9. In October 1985, Sherron entered a property management agreement with
8 Cascadian Associates to manage the Cascadian apartment complex. The agreement was
9 signed for by Springman as president of CES, the managing general partner of the LLC, and
10 by Springman as president of Sherron.

11 10. In February 1999, Sherron entered a property management agreement with
12 NAP/Springman Fund XI (Place 10) LLC to manage the Fund XI's apartment complex. The
13 agreement was signed for by NAP/Springman Fund (Place 10) LLC by Springman as
14 president of CES, the manager of the LLC, and by Springman as president of Sherron.

15 11. On October 1, 1988, Sherron entered a property management agreement with
16 Highlander Associates to manage the Highlander apartment complex. The agreement was
17 signed for by Springman as president of CES, the managing general partner of the LLC, and
18 by Springman as president of Sherron.

19 12. In November 2000, Sherron entered a property management agreement with
20 Belmont/Republican Associates, LLC to manage the Belmont apartment complex. The
21 agreement was signed for by Springman as president of CES, the manager of the LLC, and by
22 Springman as president of Sherron.

1 13. On May 10, 2000, Sherron entered a property management agreement with
2 Guardian Self Storage Associates, LLC to manage Guardian's storage facility. The
3 agreement was signed for by Springman as president of CES, the manager of the LLC, and by
4 Springman as president of Sherron.
5

6 14. Each of the property management agreements for these six entities
7 (collectively referred to herein as the "**Property Management Agreements**") are identical in
8 all material respects, aside from the name of the counter-party property owner. Indeed, for
9 each of the Property Management Agreements, Springman signed on behalf of both Sherron
10 and the counter-party property owner. At this and all relevant times, these six Property
11 Management Agreements generated over 40% of the revenues that Sherron generated.
12

13 15. Beginning as early as the summer of 2015, and prior to July 15, 2016,
14 Springman, on behalf of himself and CES, began negotiations with NAPA (through its
15 representatives Glenn Gonzales and Shravan Parsi) regarding the purchase and sale of all
16 outstanding stock of Sherron.
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18 16. During negotiations, Springman, on behalf of himself and CES, provided
19 NAPA with documents that NAPA reviewed and relied upon during its due diligence,
20 including but not limited to: (1) several revised versions of financial statements for Sherron;
21 and (2) the Property Management Agreements between Sherron, as the property manager, and
22 various entities that Springman repeatedly represented he solely controlled, as the counter-
23 party property owner.
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25 17. Springman provided financial statements multiple times during the period from
26 the summer of 2015 until prior to July 15, 2016, by emails directed to NAPA's representative
27 who was located in Texas. Despite the numerous iterations, the last financial statements that
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1 Defendants provided contained material inaccuracies and omissions. NAPA relied upon these
2 financial statements in electing to purchase the Sherron stock, and in continuing to make
3 payments towards the purchase price, and in closing on the sale of the Sherron stock.
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5 18. For example, Defendants failed to disclose the financial statements: (1) were
6 based upon a cash basis rather than accrual basis; (2) reflected material amounts of monthly
7 property management revenues that were not earned during such months but instead were
8 revenues from prior months (as the person controlling both Sherron and the property
9 management clients, Springman, was able to manipulate when such revenues were recognized
10 on the financial statements); and (3) did not disclose the existence of at least one personal
11 injury claim seeking in excess of \$1 million that subsequently resulted in the initiation of a
12 recently settled lawsuit against Sherron (the “**Ayraud Claim**”) styled and numbered *Ayraud*
13 *v. Piccadilly II Associates, et al.*; Cause No. 2016CV33775; in the District Court, Denver
14 County, Colorado.
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17 19. By using a cash basis and manipulating the months during which revenues and
18 corresponding expenses were recognized (even though these months were different than the
19 dates the revenues were earned), Defendants caused the financial statements to be misleading
20 in that it appeared that Sherron was more profitable – and thus more valuable – than in fact
21 Sherron was at that time. In addition, these financial statements failed to disclose that
22 Sherron’s customers were not timely paying amounts due under the Property Management
23 Agreements, which was material information in and of itself.
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26 20. During negotiations, NAPA expressed concern because the Property
27 Management Agreements, on their face, indicated the counter-party property owners had the
28 ability to terminate the contracts for convenience on short notice. Because these contracts

1 generated over 40% of the revenue for Sherron (and thus were a primary driver of the value
2 that NAPA would obtain by purchasing the stock of Sherron), NAPA informed Springman
3 that NAPA could not purchase the Sherron stock at the price that Defendants were proposing.
4

5 21. In response, Springman, on behalf of himself and CES, assured NAPA that the
6 termination provisions were illusory and were not a risk because Springman solely controlled
7 the counter-party property owners. As such, Springman represented he had the exclusive
8 right and ability to activate the termination provision, which was false (while Springman does
9 control certain of the counter-party property owners, Springman's son claims to control at
10 least two of them). Springman represented that so long as the entities (that he solely
11 controlled) continued to own the managed properties, then Springman would keep the
12 Property Management Agreements in place with Sherron.
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14 22. Springman made these representations many times during the period from the
15 summer of 2015 until July 15, 2016 and thereafter, including but not limited to during:
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17 (1) telephone calls with NAPA's representative who was located in Texas at the time; and
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19 (2) in-person meetings with NAPA's representative while in Washington and Utah. NAPA
20 relied upon these representations in electing to purchase the Sherron stock, and in continuing
21 to make payments towards the purchase price, and in closing on the sale of the Sherron stock.

22 23. During negotiations, material misrepresentations and omissions were made by
23 Springman and CES. Material issues for which misrepresentations were made and for which
24 necessary information was not disclosed include but are not limited to: (1) the contractual
25 right of the counter-party property owners to terminate the Property Management Agreements
26 for convenience on short-notice, despite Springman's assurances to the contrary that he alone
27 controlled the decision to terminate; (2) that the Springman-controlled Sherron had failed to
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1 comply with applicable employment laws, which placed Sherron in substantial jeopardy of
2 litigation costs and undisclosed liabilities; (3) that the rent for Sherron's office space lease,
3 which was with an entity controlled by Springman, could be increased at the whim of
4 Springman; (4) the existence and scope of the employment claims; (5) that the financial
5 statements were misleading because of the manner in which they were prepared, including the
6 fact that the data reflected revenues in periods Springman was arbitrarily selecting by
7 controlling when the counter-party property owners paid property management fees (and thus
8 recognize revenue); and (6) at a minimum, Sherron's customers were not timely paying the
9 amounts due under the Property Management Agreements.
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12 24. The risk associated with the termination provisions of the Property
13 Management Agreements was material. Sherron's primary source of income derived from the
14 Property Management Agreements, which generated over 40% of the gross revenues of
15 Sherron, and thus these contracts were a material part of the actual value that NAPA would
16 obtain by purchasing the stock of Sherron. If these contracts were terminated, then:
17 (1) Sherron's gross revenue and ultimately profits would be substantially reduced; and (2) the
18 Sherron stock would be worth substantially less than the amount that NAPA paid CES.
19 Notwithstanding, CES and Springman failed to disclose this risk to NAPA and instead falsely
20 represented to NAPA that this issue did not present any actual risk to NAPA because
21 Springman controlled the counter-party property owners. Later, Defendants purported to
22 terminate the Property Management Agreements, and then improperly obtained temporary
23 injunctive relief in state court to prevent Sherron from performing under the Property
24 Management Agreements. Ultimately, Defendants transferred the management agreements
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1 over to a company that is connected to the Defendants, which they staffed with many former
2 employees of Sherron.

3 25. The risk associated with Sherron's failure to comply with applicable
4 employment laws was material. Failure to comply with these laws placed Sherron in
5 substantial jeopardy of litigation costs and undisclosed liabilities. This risk materialized when
6 a former employee initiated the civil action styled and numbered *Bray v. Sherron*
7 *Associates, Inc.*; Case No. 17-2-09757-8 SEA; in the Superior Court for the State of
8 Washington, King County.
9

10 26. The risk associated with the rental rate for Sherron's office lease was material.
11 The purchase price for the Sherron stock was determined from Sherron's historical profit,
12 which in turn was determined based in part on a static rental rate for the lease space. If the
13 rental rates could be raised arbitrarily, then the profits of Sherron would be substantially
14 reduced, and thus the value of the Sherron stock commensurately diminished.
15 Notwithstanding, CES and Springman failed to disclose this risk to NAPA.
16

17 27. The risk associated with the Ayraud Claim was material. If the plaintiff was
18 successful, then the Ayraud Claim would have materially impacted the value, assets, and
19 operational ability of Sherron. The mere potential liability arising from the Ayraud Claim
20 meant the stock of Sherron was worth substantially less than the amount that NAPA paid CES
21 at the time of the sale, regardless of any potential indemnities, which may or may not have
22 provided coverage or been sufficient to cover the amount of the exposure. Notwithstanding,
23 CES and Springman failed to disclose this risk to NAPA, and NAPA has been forced to
24 address the claim.
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1 28. The risk associated with the financial statements was material. This risk
2 materialized because the current operating income from monthly operations was misleadingly
3 conveyed due to the method of accounting, and Defendants' failure to disclose their decisions
4 to defer revenue and match that revenue with corresponding expenses. To make matters
5 worse, Springman still exerted influence over Sherron's employees, who had been reporting
6 directly to Springman. For example, Bill Wagner remained working for Sherron as its Vice
7 President of Accounting following the sale, but Wagner's loyalty still lay with Springman.
8 Following the sale of Sherron stock, Wagner prepared and delivered financial statements that
9 were materially inaccurate and misleading, which helped to conceal Defendants' prior fraud
10 for a time. Ultimately, Sherron terminated Wagner for performance, but Springman
11 demanded that Sherron pay Wagner severance by alleging that Wagner would sue Sherron for
12 age discrimination, which Springman himself encouraged Wagner to do. Sherron relented,
13 and then Springman hired Wagner to work directly for a company connected to Springman
14 that competes directly with Sherron in the property management business (in fact taking
15 several of Sherron's employees and long-time clients that Springman and his son control).
16 Based upon a non-misleading portrayal of the current operating income from monthly
17 operations (current revenues matched against current expenses that were incurred to generate
18 such current revenues), the value of the Sherron stock was materially less than what NAPA
19 agreed to pay Defendants.

20 29. The foregoing misrepresentations and omissions of fact were material in that
21 they would be viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of
22 information bearing upon the decision to purchase the Sherron stock. A reasonable investor
23 would find it significant that: (1) Sherron's financial statements were materially inaccurate in

1 that they failed to identify the accounting basis and misleadingly portrayed monthly revenues,
2 corresponding expenses, and resulting profits; did not disclose the risk that Springman had
3 controlled and could arbitrarily raise operating expenses; and did not completely disclose its
4 liabilities; (2) Sherron's customers were not timely paying amounts due under the Property
5 Management Agreements; and (3) despite Springman's assurances that the Property
6 Management Agreements would be kept in place and thus did not pose any risk, Springman
7 did not intend to honor that promise, or was prepared to breach that promise, and in at least
8 two cases, was not even able to deliver on that promise because he did not actually control
9 two of these property management clients.
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12 30. Springman, and thus CES, knew these representations were false at the time
13 they were made because Springman had actual knowledge of the truth about the subject
14 matters of the representations. Likewise, Springman, and thus CES, had actual knowledge of
15 the omitted facts during the negotiations, at all times leading up to the initiation of the
16 transaction; while receiving payments from NAPA for the purchase price of the Sherron
17 stock; and prior to the closing of the sale of the Sherron stock.
18

19 31. Springman is and was at all times the sole owner of CES, and CES was at the
20 time the sole owner of Sherron and, as such, had knowledge of all aspects of Sherron's
21 operations and finances. Simply put, there was no person other than Springman who could
22 possibly know more about the actual information regarding Sherron's operations and
23 finances.
24

25 32. According to his biography published on his website, Springman has since
26 1969 been involved in property development, construction, and management of projects
27 ranging from apartments, hotels, senior living centers, storage facilities, shopping centers,
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1 private financing, and other investment opportunities across the western United States. This
2 biography continues that Springman leverages his strengths of having a keenness in finding
3 lucrative investment opportunities, solid negotiating skills, and the ability to raise capital.
4

5 33. Springman has made a career as an investor and as a solicitor of investments
6 from others, and thus Springman is well-familiar what information bears on investment
7 decisions. Springman's education and experience give rise to a strong inference that
8 Springman, and thus CES, acted with the requisite scienter, in making these
9 misrepresentations and in omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make other
10 statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
11 In addition, the substantial compensation that CES, and thus Springman, received from the
12 sale of the Sherron stock to NAPA also gives rise to a strong inference that Defendants acted
13 with the requisite scienter. Based on upon these facts, Defendants had both the motive and
14 opportunity to commit securities fraud. From the totality of these facts, a holistic inference is
15 apparent that Defendants acted with some degree of intentional or conscious misconduct, or
16 deliberate recklessness.
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18 34. NAPA actually and justifiably relied upon the misrepresentations and
19 omissions in deciding to purchase the Sherron stock. But for these misrepresentations, NAPA
20 would not have agreed to pay the full amount that was actually paid and might not have
21 purchased the Sherron stock at all (depending on the price). Reliance is presumed with
22 respect to the omissions. In any event, NAPA might not have purchased the Sherron stock at
23 all (depending on the price), and would not have purchased the Sherron stock at the price
24 agreed if this information had been disclosed.
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35. The harm from the misrepresentations and omissions materialized when:

(1) Springman rendered the Property Management Agreements inoperative by obtaining a TRO in a Washington state court that was awarded only because Springman misled the Court at an ex parte hearing and that has since been determined to have been wrongfully sought and wrongfully obtained as Springman misled the Court; thus, it was dissolved and found to be entered in error; (2) Springman demanded payment of around \$300,000 from Sherron; (3) Springman raised the office space rent such that Sherron had to relocate to new office space at considerable cost in terms of lost productivity, moving expenses, and increased rent; (4) Sherron was sued by a former employee for violations of applicable employment laws; (5) Sherron was sued in connection with personal injury claims; and (6) the financial statements proved to be materially misleading.

36. CES, and ultimately its sole shareholder Springman, obtained substantial benefit from all of the misrepresentations and omissions of fact by obtaining payment of an amount above the actual market value of the Sherron stock, plus additional fringe benefits made directly to Springman such as ongoing compensation, insurance, free office space, equipment, and personnel, and other perks. These misrepresentations and omissions were at least a substantial factor in bringing about injury to NAPA. When the misrepresentations were disclosed, and as the concealed risks materialized, the actual value of the Sherron stock was revealed to be materially less, and NAPA has suffered substantial losses – in excess of \$75,000.00 and into the seven figures – as a foreseeable result.

IV. CAUSES OF ACTION

37. All conditions precedent to NAPA's recovery have occurred or have been waived, excused, or otherwise satisfied. All notices required have been provided or were

1 waived, excused, or otherwise satisfied. NAPA repeats and incorporates the allegations set
2 forth in Articles I, II, III, and V.

3 **A. VIOLATIONS OF 15 U.S.C. §§ 78A, ET SEQ., & RELATED RULES &**
4 **REGULATIONS**

5 38. NAPA realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set
6 forth above.

7 39. The Sherron stock that NAPA purchased is a security within the meaning of
8 federal securities laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, et seq.

9 40. In connection with the offer and sale of the Sherron stock, CES, through
10 Springman: (1) made untrue statements of a material fact and omitted to state material facts
11 necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
12 they were made, not misleading; and (2) engaged in an act, practice, or course of business that
13 operated as a fraud or deceit upon NAPA. Springman directly or indirectly controlled CES in
14 connection with these violations. Springman directly or indirectly committed these violations
15 through or by means of CES. Springman held ultimate authority over the misrepresentations
16 and omissions, including their content and whether and how to communicate the information.
17

18 41. Defendants are jointly and severally liable to NAPA for rescission or actual
19 damages (out-of-pocket damages being the difference between the price paid and the true
20 value of the Sherron stock), pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, court costs, and
21 attorneys' fees.
22

23 **B. VIOLATIONS OF TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ART. 581-1, ET SEQ.**

24 42. NAPA realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set
25 forth above.
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1 43. The stock of Sherron that NAPA purchased is a security within the meaning of
2 the Texas Securities Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 581-1, *et seq.* (the “**Texas Securities Act**”).

3 44. Defendants sold the securities to NAPA, which was formed and is
4 headquartered in Texas, and whose members reside and are domiciled in Texas. This sale
5 was directed to and made in part in Texas to a Texas resident.
6

7 45. A person who offers or sells a security by means of an untrue statement of
8 material fact or an omission to state a material fact that is necessary in order to make the
9 statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, is
10 liable to the buyer for rescission or damages. There is no need to show intent, reliance, loss
11 causation, due diligence, or that the loss could not have been avoided under the Texas
12 Securities Act. The only required showing is of materiality.
13

14 46. CES sold securities by means of untrue statements of material facts and/or
15 omissions to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
16 of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The representations and
17 omissions were material because there is an appreciable likelihood that it could have
18 significantly affected the investment decisions of a reasonable investor, and a reasonable
19 investor would consider such information important in deciding whether to invest.
20

21 47. Springman controlled CES. Springman directly or indirectly with intent to
22 deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aided CES in
23 the sale of the Sherron stock. Therefore, Springman and CES are jointly and severally liable
24 for these claims.
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1 48. Defendants are liable to NAPA for statutory rescission or damages, including
2 interest. In addition, Defendants are liable for costs, attorneys' fees, and exemplary damages.
3 NAPA also seeks recovery of post-judgment interest.
4

5 **C. STATUTORY FRAUD (TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 27.01)**

6 49. NAPA realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set
7 forth above.

8 50. The transaction at issue here involved the sale of securities. During this
9 transaction, Defendants: (a) made false representations of fact, (b) made false promises;
10 and/or (c) benefitted by not disclosing that their own or a third party's representations or
11 promises were false. Each of the Defendants benefitted by not disclosing the falsity of the
12 representations and promises of the other Defendant and the Springman-controlled counter-
13 party property owners. Defendants made the false representations and promises for the
14 purpose of inducing NAPA to enter the transaction. NAPA relied upon the representations
15 and promises, which caused NAPA injury.
16

17 51. Defendants are jointly and severally liable to NAPA for rescission (or
18 alternatively actual damages), exemplary damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest,
19 court costs, expert witness fees, deposition fees, and attorneys' fees.
20

21 **D. COMMON-LAW FRAUD & FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT**

22 52. NAPA realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set
23 forth above.
24

25 53. Springman, and thus CES, made numerous false representations and promises
26 to NAPA. Defendants also benefitted by not disclosing the falsity of the representations.
27 Springman, and thus CES, each made these false representations or promises, or failed to
28

1 make any disclosures, for the purpose of inducing NAPA to agree to and ultimately purchase
2 the Sherron stock.

3 54. Each of these representations and promises was material in that a reasonable
4 person would attach importance to and be induced to act on the information in determining
5 whether to enter a transaction. These representations and promises were made directly to
6 NAPA. NAPA relied upon these representations and promises in entering the transaction,
7 which proximately caused NAPA injury. Defendants either knew the representations and
8 promises were false, or made the representation recklessly, as a positive assertion, and
9 without knowledge of the truth. Defendants did this with the intent that NAPA act upon the
10 same. NAPA did in fact actually and justifiably rely upon them, which caused NAPA injury.

11 55. Defendants failed to disclose information to NAPA. Defendants had a duty to
12 disclose this information to NAPA because: (1) they discovered new information that made
13 their earlier representations misleading or untrue; (2) they created a false impression by
14 making a partial disclosure; and/or (3) they voluntarily disclosed some information and
15 therefore had a duty to disclose the whole truth. Defendants knew NAPA did not know this
16 information and did not have an equal opportunity to discover this information. Defendants
17 deliberately failed to inform NAPA of these facts, and in so doing intended to induce NAPA
18 into taking some action or refraining to act. NAPA was injured as a result of acting without
19 knowledge of these facts.

20 56. Each of these omissions was material in that a reasonable person would have
21 considered the omitted information important in deciding the course of action to take.

22 Reliance is presumed since a reasonable investor would have considered this information

1 important in deciding whether to invest. NAPA actually and justifiably relied on this
2 information in that it would not have invested had it known the truth.

3 57. Defendants are jointly and severally liable to NAPA for rescission or
4 alternatively actual damages (benefit of the bargain damages, or out-of-pocket losses),
5 exemplary damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and court costs.
6

7 **E. VIOLATIONS OF SECURITIES ACT OF WASHINGTON**

8 58. NAPA realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set
9 forth above.
10

11 59. The stock of Sherron that NAPA purchased is a security within the meaning of
12 the Securities Act of the State of Washington, RCW Ch. 21.20 (the “**Securities Act of**
13 **Washington**”).
14

15 60. A person who offers or sells a security by means of an untrue statement of
16 material fact or an omission to state a material fact that is necessary in order to make the
17 statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, is
18 liable to the buyer for rescission or damages.
19

20 61. CES sold securities by means of untrue statements of material facts and/or
21 omissions to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
22 of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The representations and
23 omissions were material because there is an appreciable likelihood that it could have
24 significantly affected the investment decisions of a reasonable investor, and a reasonable
25 investor would consider such information important in deciding whether to invest.
26

27 62. Springman controlled CES. Springman directly or indirectly with intent to
28 deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aided CES in

1 the sale of the Sherron stock. Therefore, Springman and CES are jointly and severally liable
2 for these claims.

3 63. In addition, the securities sold by Defendants CES and Springman were not
4 registered pursuant to the Securities Act of the State of Washington, RCW Ch. 21.20.
5

6 64. Defendants, by their own acts, misrepresentations, and omissions alleged
7 herein, violated the Securities Act of Washington.

8 65. The Securities Act of Washington, provides in RCW 21.20.430 that any person
9 who offers or sells a security in violation of RCW 21.20.010, 21.20.140, or 21.20.430 shall be
10 liable to the person buying the security for damages, plus costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and
11 interest. The Act, RCW 21.20.430, further provides for rescission of transactions in violation
12 of the Act, including return of the full purchase amounts, together with interest at 8% (eight
13 percent) per annum from the date of each purchase until payment.
14
15

16 66. Defendants' violations of the Securities Act of Washington have proximately
17 caused NAPA to be damaged in an amount to be proven at time of trial. NAPA has incurred
18 and will continue to incur substantial attorneys' fees in the prosecution of this action.
19

20 **F. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION**

21 67. NAPA realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set
22 forth above.

23 68. Defendants, by their acts and omissions alleged herein, negligently or
24 intentionally made false representations and omissions of fact, which induced Plaintiff to
25 invest in the master recordings through defendants.
26

27 69. Defendants' negligent misrepresentations and omissions proximately caused
28 damages to Plaintiff in an amount to be proven at trial.

V. THEORIES OF LIABILITY

70. **Direct Actor Liability**. Springman made material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with CES's sale of Sherron stock. Therefore, Springman is jointly and severally liable with CES because a corporate actor is personally liable for tortious conduct even if committed while acting on behalf of the entity.

71. **Respondeat Superior/Vice-Principal**. Springman is and was acting in the course and scope of his employment and agency with CES at the time the misrepresentations and omissions were made. Therefore, CES and Springman are jointly and severally liable.

72. **Beneficiary of Fraud & Ratification**. Defendants each knowingly benefitted from the fraud of one another and adopted the misrepresentations as their own. Therefore, Defendants are jointly and severally liable.

VI. PRAYER

Wherefore, NAPA respectfully prays for joint and several judgment and relief against Defendants as follows:

1. For an award of damages in excess of \$75,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial;
2. For an award of exemplary damages under Texas law;
3. For an award of Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the statutes cited above;
4. For an award of pre- and post-judgment interest;
5. For an award of Plaintiff's costs and disbursements to be taxed herein; and
6. For such other and relief as the Court deems may deem just and proper.

1 Dated this 25th day of October, 2017.

2 HILLIS CLARK MARTIN & PETERSON P.S.

3
4 By s/Eric D. Lansverk
Eric D. Lansverk, WSBA #17218
Alexander M. Wu, WSBA #40649
5 999 Third Avenue, Suite 4600
6 Seattle, WA 98104
7 Tel: (206) 623-1745
8 Fax: (206) 623-7789
E-mail: eric.lansverk@hcmp.com
Alex.Wu@hcmp.com

9 Attorneys for Plaintiff

10 ND: 22450.003 4828-5496-0721v2